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Citing evidence on intercity differences in crime rates, as well
as differences in rates of increase for several kinds of crime, this
paper argues that police departments differ in their effectiveness.
The key to an understanding of effectiveness lies in the way police
departments themselves are organized. How individual police-
men perform their occupational duties depends in part on how
these duties are defined. In order to understand these definitions
and the pressures which affect the way police perform their work,
it is necessary to adopt a "systemic" view of legal and illegal
forces in society. Determinants of police effectiveness are ex-
plored, through examples from the control of organized crimes,
by relating the way departments interact with other legal and
illegal organizations.
SEVERAL COMPRTING THEORIES Ofcrime control have been given in-
creasing public and legislative atten-
tion in the past few years. Many citi-
zens who cry out against &dquo;crime in the
streets&dquo; advocate solving the problem
by increasing the number and power
of police and by punishing offenders
more severely. On the other hand,
many social workers and social scien-
tists would initiate mammoth pro-
grams designed to bring about the
Great Society, thus removing the so-
cial causes of crime.
Both of these approaches overlook
* Publication A-67, Survey Research Center,
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the organizational dimension of police
departments as a factor determining
the effectiveness of law enforcement
efforts to eliminate organized crime.
One approach adheres to a beehive
perspective of police departments:
every department in every city has the
same form of organization, and the
only way to increase the sting and the
honey is to add more bees. Advocates
of the other approach are concerned
with the dangers of a police state and
the use of police departments as tools
by unscrupulous politicians.
Police departments must be put in
a new, unbiased perspective if progress
is to be made either in understanding
or in controlling organized crime. It
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is especially important to realize that
departments differ in their operations
and that they are capable of drama-
tically altering the extent to which
they are effective in the fight against
crime. Concern with the internal or-
ganization of departments and with
the relationship between departments
and the organizational environments
in which they operate is crucial in ob-
taining this new perspective.
One cannot examine police effec-
tiveness independently of criminals,
city governments, courts, and others
with whom the police have an occupa-
tional concern. In America the signifi-
cance of the police derives to a con-
siderable extent from the magnitude
of crime. About two million major
crimes a year are reported, and the
value of stolen property is estimated
at $600 million. It seems reasonable
to predict that the crime problem will
become even more serious in the fu-
ture. It is said, for example, that
crime is increasing five times faster
than the population.
The growth of lawlessness is not,
however, a unique American phenome-
non. In England and Wales, the num-
ber of &dquo;persons found guilty of
indictable offenses&dquo; per 100,000 popu-
lation increased from 502 in 1955 to
747 in 1960. In Sweden, &dquo;crimes known
to the police,&dquo; standardized for the
size of population, have also shown
an increase over the years.
Crime-reporting procedures vary so
greatly from one country to the next
that international comparisons of
crime rates are not reliable. Neverthe-
less, current information-admittedly
inadequate-suggests the dismal hy-
pothesis that societies have a normal
rate of crime. This rate, it seems, is
predicted by a nation’s level of indus-
trialization, so that we can look in the
future to an ever increasing crime
problem in all societies around the
world.
If this prophecy is reasonably accu-
rate, the police will play an increas-
ingly important role in society. This
role need not be one of strategic ham-
lets in which precinct stations serve as
control centers in the war against a
hostile, lawless countryside. Two sets
of statistics, neither one of which is
guaranteed to be accurate, suggest that
the police are able, when properly
organized, to influence the rate at
which crime rates will increase or de-
crease.
First, some types of crime are in-
creasing more slowly than others, and
a few rates are actually decreasing.
Table I presents the arrest rates for
three examples of organized crime,
each of which is, when compared with
most other types of crime, relatively
easy to control by energetic and effec-
tive police action. In the ten-year pe-
riod 1950-60, the arrest rate for viola-
tions of narcotic and drug laws more
than doubled. In contrast, the arrest
rate for prostitution and commercial-
ized vice was almost halved, and arrests
for gambling also decreased. These fig-
ures do not mean that police depart-
ments are becoming less concerned
with organized crime or that the gap
is widening between arrest rates and
rates at which these crimes are ac-
tually committed in the population at
large. Rather, in part, the lower rates
probably reflect increased effectiveness
in performance of police duties.
Second, crime rates vary sharply
from city to city. These differences
suggest either that police departments
in some cities are more effective than
others or that they differ widely in
what they consider a crime. In any
event, they suggest that departments
differ greatly in performance and, in-
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TABLE 1
ARREST RATE (NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER 100,000 POPULATION) FOR THREE TYPES OF
ORGANIZED CRIME’
. Figures obtained from Uniform Crime Reports for th~ United States, 1950, 1960.
ferentially, in their ability to control
and eliminate crime. Table 2 presents
differences in crime rates between
cities of approximately the same size
within the same state. The size factor
is a crude statistical control for the
complex of factors that tend to pro-
duce criminal activity, and the state
factor is a crude statistical control for
differences in legal definitions of
crime. Overall, the difference in crime
rates for paired cities is quite startling.
Police departments are differen-
tiated in several other ways. In Cali-
fornia, for example, the Oakland and
San Francisco departments are consid-
ered by many to have a better rela-
tionship with minority groups than
does Los Angeles. In dealing with
civil liberties, some departments have
been known to tolerate overzealous
search and seizure procedures, prac-
tices which invite the federal courts to
enter into the administration of crimi-
nal justice at the local level (see
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [1961]).
More generally, some departments-
for example, Milwaukee and Los An-
geles - have national reputations to-
day for being &dquo;clean&dquo; departments,
while others - for example, Chicago
and Boston-suffer from poor reputa-
tions. These reputations refer to the
amount of police corruption and inef-
ficiency, which are themselves partly
responsible for the crime problem.
In the last ten years a great number
of examples of police-criminal collu-
sion have come to the public’s atten-
tion. A partial list of departments
with known unsavory incidents would
includes Baltimore, Burlington (Vt.) ,
Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Hudson
County (N.J.), Los Angeles, Miami,
Nashville, New York, New Orleans,
Omaha~ San Francisco, Tulsa, and
TABLE 2
CRIME RATE (CRIMES REPORTEDA PER 100,who
POPU1-tTION) FOR SELECTED CITIES, 1956b
I These are &dquo;Part I&dquo; crimes-criminal hom-
icide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, bur-
glary, larceny, and auto theft.
b Vernon L. Hoy, &dquo;The Police Specialist
in District Stations&dquo; (M.Sc. Pub. Adm. thesis,
University of Southern California, School of
Public Administration, June 1958), pp. 85-90.
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Washington, D.C.--cities in every re-
gion of the country.
Some departments are, as Suther-
land put it, &dquo;systematically lawless.&dquo;
&dquo;This does not mean,&dquo; he noted, &dquo;that
every policeman is lawless, but that as
a system the police operate in a law-
less manner.&dquo; Police graft is a good
example of systematic lawlessness.
Royal Commission studies in Eng-
land, as well as many local, state, and
national studies in America, have
documented such lawlessness as proof
of the existence of organized criminal
groups. In such instances, the criminal
world tends to control the overall per-
formance of entire police depart-
ments. However, there is considerable
evidence that departments are able to
change for the better. In many cities
the police, for some as yet unknown
reason, have been able to drastically
reduce incidents of organized crimes.
Prostitution, gambling, and narcotics
seem to be especially amenable to po-
lice control.
Police Operations
The few social scientists who have
studied the police have focused almost
exclusively upon the situation of the
individual policeman. By doing so,
they overlook the organizational di-
mension of crime control, a perspec-
tive that can be approached primarily
through a comparative study of de-
partments. A narrow concern with the
individual policeman can also lead to
erroneous findings of what are thought
to be unique hazards. For example,
one study claimed that feelings of in-
adequate public recognition and even
outright community disrespect con-
tributed to the policeman’s proclivity
to employ unwarranted force in the
performance of his tasks.’ Of course,
other studies have found that al-
though ministers and college profes-
sors also feel they are not given ade-
quate community recognition, these
feelings do not lead them to any no-
ticeable misuse of their position to
manipulate parishioners and stu-
dents.2 Furthermore, there is no evi-
dence to date that differences in the
use of force by individual police-
men, or departmental differences in
the use of force, are in any way re-
lated to differences in felt deprivation
on the part of individual policemen.
Although a study of the individual po-
liceman is not without value, the
limitations of this perspective deserve
notice.
A concern with police systems also
has its limitations, but it can lead to
a better understanding of a depart-
ment’s effectiveness in its program
against organized crime. Specifically,
if we consider effectiveness not only as
a significant and measurable concept
but also as a characteristic of organi-
zations rather than of individuals, a
number of social science approaches to
the study of organizations can be
adopted to throw new light on police
systems. For example, it is possible to
study how departments which differ in
internal organization, as well as in
their relations to various community
groups, also differ in their ability to
control organized crime. Although
such studies have not actually been
conducted, some scattered evidence in-
dicates the value of such an organiza-
tional or &dquo;systemic&dquo; approach to po-
lice operations.
1 William A. Westley, "Violence and the
Police," American Journal of Sociology, July
1953, pp. 34-41.
2 Robert Edward Mitchell, "When Minis-
ters and Their Parishioners Have Different
Class Positions," Review of Religious Re-
search, Fall 1965, pp. 28-41.
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INSIDE POLICE DEPARTMENTS
A fairly large though dull corpus of
literature has been compiled on how
to reduce costs and allocate resources
within police departments. It in-
cludes a folklore on how to keep po-
lice systems healthy and effective,
making unfounded assertions that
relate salaries, vacations, promotions,
and swing shifts to the morale of de-
partments.
Such conjectures refer to an entire
police department, but the major re-
sponsibility for the control of orga-
nized crime rests heavily on certain
special groups within the department,
especially vice squads, detective bu-
reaus, and intelligence units. These
typically are 61ite groups: their salary
scales are higher, they recruit the more
able men, their responsibilities are in-
tellectually more demanding, and they
are able to work in mufti. Yet in
many cities these elite elements have
not been notably successful against
organized crime. In fact, since vice
squads often desert to the enemy, a
closer scrutiny of them may provide
hints on how to organize police de-
partments for a more effective offense
against organized crime.
Vice squads are organized in a num-
ber of different ways. In some cities
their functions are distributed through-
out the force; in others, there is a
strict division of labor, including con-
straints on what patrolmen and detec-
tives can do in vice cases. In some
instances the squad concerns itself
with juvenile vice, while in others this
is primarily the responsibility of spe-
cial juvenile officers. Some vice squads
have special narcotics and other de-
tails. Some rotate their members so
that continually new, relatively unsul-
lied men are charged with the often
undesirable, tempting work. In some
large departments the squad operates
out of a central headquarters; in oth-
ers the vice squad work is divided into
multipurpose details, each of which
operates out of a local precinct.
These variations have developed as
means to control not only criminals
but also police. However, despite local
claims made for particular variations,
no systematic information has ever
been marshaled to prove that any one
organizational pattern is more effec-
tive than another. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that any such assessment of
effectiveness can be made without first
placing departments within the larger
context of their operation.
A major key to effectiveness is
found in the external challenges and
obstacles to law enforcement, for these
help define both the goals of police
departments and the means available
to them. How are departments affected
by the general community, other legal
agencies, political and civil authori-
ties, and the criminal world itself?
THE COMMUNITY
Police in many communities have
ample reason to complain about the
public’s failure to assist them in pre-
venting avoidable crime. People are
murdered and robbed because of their
neighbors’ apathy, and criminals are
let free because witnesses to their
crime refuse to &dquo;get involved.&dquo; Such
attitudes certainly make it harder for
the police to perform their work effec-
tively. They also suggest that fiction
and myth surround the role assigned
to police in American society. The
police picture themselves as operating
under conditions similar to those in
England, while, in fact, the American
public has a continental perspective of
law enforcement. The distinction be-
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tween these systems was recently
drawn by a Royal Commission which
referred to a fundamental contrast
&dquo;between the Continental principle of
placing responsibility for the mainte-
nance of law and order upon the ex-
ecutive government and arming it
with powers of direct enforcement,
and the British principle that it is the
right and duty of each citizen to pre-
serve the peace and bring the malefac-
tors to justice, with its corollary that
the police are merely paid to act on
the citizen’s behalf.&dquo;
The contrast on this view is seen in
small things and big things alike: the
British police are unarmed, but most po-
licemen on the Continent carry arms; and
political and secret police appear to flour-
ish on the Continent, for their role as
agents of the state leaves them a prey to
political extremists.3
A number of recent legal measures
have been designed to swing the
American population over from the
Continental to the British pattern.
For example, some Good Samaritan
bills hold a citizen liable to legal
prosecution for failing to comply with
a policeman’s request for assistance.
If such legislation is successful, per-
haps it will make deputies of us all
and thereby place the public on a par
with the police in a situation similar
to that which legally exists in Eng-
land, where, in the view of the com-
mon law, a policeman is only &dquo;a per-
son paid to perform, as a matter of
duty, acts which if he were so minded
he might have done voluntarily.&dquo;4
However, the history of guerrilla
warfare teaches us that it is not easy
to transform a hostile peasantry into
informers and collaborators. After all,
the police are not spearheading a
revolutionary attack on society, and
their work does not have a visible im-
pact on the economic, political, and
social welfare of the population.
Therefore, the effect of this moralistic
approach to the crime problem is
questionable. Nevertheless, its possible
benefits should not be neglected. Cer-
tainly, studies should be conducted on
how these Good Samaritan laws affect
the public’s attitudes and the effec-
tiveness of police departments.
OTHER LEGAL AND QUASI-LEGAL
SYSTEMS
Local police departments operate
within and are affected by a system of
legal agencies. The federal govern-
ment has treasury, narcotics, Internal
Revenue, and postal police groups as
well as the FBI; the state, the county,
and the local community often have
comparable groups, including quasi-
official crime commissions, and, of
course, district attorneys. In addition
to these law enforcement agencies,
there is also the court system, includ-
ing judges, lawyers, bondsmen, and
the like.
Courts have a singularly important
impact on the operation and effective-
ness of departments, for they are the
major mechanisms serving to control
the police. They help define the law
by the evidence they admit, the pro-
portion of defendants they convict and
sentence, and the severity of the judg-
ments they hand down-actions which
reward and punish police behavior
and thereby help the policeman de-
fine and enforce the law. The impor-
tant implications of these processes for
the police are seen perhaps most
clearly in the English experience with
a 1948 bill on juvenile first offenders,
which resulted in a 60 per cent drop
3 Royal Commission on the Police, Final
Report (London: H.M.S.O., 1962).
4 Ibid.
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in the number of juveniles sent to
prison. Investigations related to such
First Offender bills revealed a wide
diversity among the thousand or so
magistrate courts in England. Some
courts committed to prison as little as
8 per cent of the accused; others, as
much as 40 per cent.5 While these
figures may reflect differences in police
departments and public prosecutors,
as well as in the courts, they also sug-
gest that departments differ in their
experiences with the courts and that
police behavior that is rewarded in
one community is punished in an-
other.
My informal interviews with Amer-
ican lawyers indicate that these same
problems occur here and are seriously
aggravated by the political appoint-
ment of often unqualified men to the
bench. An unprofessional court sys-
tem amenable to political pressure re-
sults in practices which discourage
and demoralize police departments:
judges issue &dquo;quickie&dquo; writs releasing
offenders &dquo;with connections,&dquo; they
throw cases out of court, and in some
communities they publicly chastise the
arresting police officers. The lawyers
suggested that police officers soon
learn it is useless to arrest certain
criminals or to crack down on certain
types of crime.
In many communities police depart-
ments can become effective only if the
courts are first reformed. California’s
Special Crime Study Commission on
Organized Crime forcefully made this
same point in 1950.~ The Commission
also noted that &dquo;there are about 75 po-
lice, justices, and municipal courts or
departments thereof in Los Angeles
County with criminal jurisdiction.&dquo;
For the most part, they are completely
independent units with &dquo;almost as
many interpretations of the criminal
laws as there are judges.&dquo; This pro-
liferation of satellite cities within a
single metropolitan area7 increases the
likelihood that organized criminal ele-
ments will be able to locate at least
one safe haven from which to manage
their affairs in the larger area. In
such areas, it is not enough to reform
one community; all of them need at-
tention.
Therefore, the effectiveness of po-
lice departments seems to be affected
by thE operation of the courts-by the
proporrion of all police arrests that
eventually result in conviction, the
quality of sentencing, the court rec-
ords on specific offenses, the types of
evidence admitted, the record on writs
of habeas corpus, practices regarding
first offenders, and the like. Effective-
ness may also be influenced by the
typical operations of lawyers, bonds-
men, parole officers, district attorneys,
and others who are involv ed in the
administration of criminal justice and
therefore impinge on and affect the
performance of police tasks.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
Police departments, as well as the
courts, have to be considered in the
still wider perspective of the commu-
nities in which they operate and the
people who appoint and pay them.
Earlier journalistic critiques of the
police were typically placed within
this larger framework, and charges
5 Ibid.
6 California Special Crime Study Commis-
sion on Organized Crime. Third Progress
Report, 1950.
7 Los Angeles County had forty-six separate
law enforcement agencies in 1950, and Chi-
cago had more than four hundred independ-
ent police forces within fifty miles of the
center of the city.
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were made that political parties and
city governments subverted the per-
formance and effectiveness of police
departments. In this connection Suth-
erland noted that &dquo;Formally, the po-
lice department is organized to op-
erate for the welfare of society; infor-
mally, it is organized for the welfare
of the politicians.&dquo;8 Since the politi-
cians are assumed to have considerable
influence on the courts and upon gov-
ernment administration, and since it
is also often assumed that politicians
are influenced by criminal elements in
the community, it seems likely that
the effectiveness of the police is re-
lated to the ethical standards and
practices of politicians and public
servants. This relationship was noted
in 1894-95 by the Lexow Committee
in New York City, where it was found
that the same system of bribery used
by criminals was also used by commis-
sion merchants, contractors, pushcart
vendors, and bootblacks who wanted
to use the public streets for private
business. In other words, the police
alone were not corrupt; corruption
characterized the entire governmental
system. There is no reason to suppose
that this characterization is not appli-
cable today. A report by the Califor-
nia Crime Study Commission in 1949
indicated that &dquo;it is common practice
of slot machine operators throughout
the country to pay 10 per cent to 20
per cent of their gross profit for pro-
tection and graft.... $400,000,000 is
being spent annually by the slot ma-
chine racketeers for bribery and cor-
ruption of public executive officers.&dquo;9
All criminals are more or less depend-
ent upon their social contacts with more
respectable members of society and this
is particularly true of those engaged in
commercial forms of crime. For them,
friendship with political figures is abso-
lutely essential. In no other way can the
criminal groups and syndicates obtain
that immunity from interference by law
enforcement agencies which is just as
essential to successful gang operations as
the discipline imposed by acts of vio-
lence.lo
THE WORLD OF ORGANIZED CRIME
Some cynics would debate whether
criminals are more deplorable and
antisocial than police departments
and city halls. Certainly many observ-
ers would agree with William Foote
Whyte’s assertion that &dquo;the primary
function of the police department is
not the enforcement of the law but
the regulation of illegal activities,
Numerous crime investigations as well
as Whyte’s study of Cornerville sup-
port this claim. Furthermore, they
suggest that crime, like the police, can
be viewed as a system. The police as
a system or group seem to interact
with crime as a system in the process
of regulating it. Examples of how
these mutually interpenetrating sys-
tems operate were noted recently by a
grand jury in Kansas City, which ac-
cused the police of cooperating with
criminal elements, giving them a mo-
nopoly over local crime in return for
assistance in controlling disruptive
criminal activities. In Denver, the ab-
sence of a strong criminal system
seems to have contributed to the
openly criminal activities of the po-
lice : police salaries were not supple-8 Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles of Crim-
inology, 5th ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippin-
cott, 1955).
9 California Special Crime Study Commis-
sion on Organized Crime, Second Progress
Report, 1949.
10 Op. cit. supra note 6.
11 William Foote Whyte, Street Corner So-
ciety (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1955).
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mented by illegal gratuities, and the
police excursion into criminal activi-
ties was not countered by entrenched
organized criminal interests. In other
cities, organized crime actually seems
to regulate police activities, keeping
them relatively honest.
It is probably useful to view police-
criminal behavior from a sociological
perspective of intergroup relations.
The police and criminal systems rep-
resent conflict groups, each trying to
regulate the behavior of the other.
This process is mediated by a variety
of rniddlemen - bondsmen, lawyers,
marginal criminal elements, ex-police-
men, judges, politicians, or, as the
California crime commission stated in
1950, by some of the &dquo;more respectable
members of society.&dquo; The public be-
comes aware of this interaction
through its most common manifesta-
tions : graft, corruption, and the pay-
off.
If this intergroup perspective is ten-
able, it follows that the way and the
extent to which the two groups are
organized will affect the course of
their mutual relations. Put in another
way, the organization of crime affects
those groups charged with controlling
it. This means that an understanding
of the organization and operation of
crime is necessary for a full under-
standing of the actual performance of
police departments. An understanding
of other organizations in the com-
munity is also necessary for an under-
standing of police departments.
However, the merging of this double
perspective from which departments
and their environments have been
viewed raises a crucial question. If the
effectiveness of police departments is
so heavily influenced by the organiza-
tion of the community, other legal
and quasi-legal agencies, politicians,
city administrations, and the criminal
world itself, is it possible that depart-
ments can by their own independent
efforts become more effective in their
campaign against organized crime?
Or, given this interorganizational sys-
tem which we have pictured, is greater
police effectiveness dependent on a
balanced program of reform of all the
relevant social actors in this social
system? More specifically, what inde-
pendent influence can an internal re-
organization of a police department
have upon the obstacles to effective-
ness raised by the outside community?
These questions have in the past been
the concern primarily of policy-mak-
ers, as suggested in the earlier men-
tioned ideological conflict between
groups which adhere to the beehive
theory of police work and those who
direct their primary attention to elimi-
nating the causes of crime. On the
other hand, it has been our argument
that greater attention should be given
to reforming police departments inter-
nally so that they can cope more effec-
tively with the external obstacles
created by groups in the larger , com-
munity.
Ineffectiveness and Democracy
Much of the social science literature
on crime and, especially, juvenile de-
linquency, refers to deviant subcul-
tures. Cloward and Ohlin concern
themselves specifically with how de-
linquent subcultures are created, sus-
tained, and, possibly, transformed.12
One might also expect that ineffective,
corrupt police departments would
have characteristically antisocial, de-
viant cultures. For example, the mem-
bers of such departments might ad-
12 Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, De-
linquency and Opportunity (New York: Free
Press, 1960).
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here to life philosophies which hold
that man is inherently evil, that he is
not to be trusted, that he must be held
responsible for all his actions, that
the wrongdoer is incapable of being
reformed, and that physical force and
coercion are the only worthwhile tools
the policeman has - all views which
may contribute to the control of crime
but which at the same time contravene
many honored American values. One
might also expect the members of such
departments to place little value on
strict adherence to the law and to be-
lieve that deviation is normal and
therefore not deviant, that there is no
reason to expect the police to act any
differently from the rest of the nor-
mally corrupt society, and that life is
a gamble, requiring risks but also af-
fording opportunities for personal
profit - all views which encourage
poor police performance.
However, it is important to distin-
guish corruption from ineffectiveness.
Police departments with identical cul-
tures can differ greatly from one an-
other simply because of the different
ways they are organized. Of course,
some departments are so ill-adapted to
their environments that pressures are
created which lead almost inevitably
to a socially undesirable culture com-
pletely at odds with the publicly
stated goals of the police. But, if
studies of industrial, medical, military,
and other organizations have any rele-
vance to police organizations, we
would expect that the way a depart-
ment is organized will affect the
stresses which its members feel in their
occupational roles and also the ways
in which they react to these stresses.
When the stresses are of a certain
kind, and when they are distributed
in a certain pattern within the depart-
ment, ineffectiveness and possibly cor-
ruption will be the product.
It is dangerous to assume, as so
many human relations experts do,
that stress is necessarily undesirable
and that organizations should be in-
ternally re-arranged in order to relieve
any personal frustrations which em-
ployees experience in the course of
fulfilling their job responsibilities. On
the contrary, the viability of other
features of American life may depend
on the continued relative ineffective-
ness of police departments and the
perpetual frustration of policemen.
Re-organization for complete effec-
tiveness in the fight against crime
might place the police in a position
where they can easily violate many
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
This is a danger to which we must be
alert, but it should not be allowed to
delay overd,ue efforts to discover ways
to increase the effectiveness of this
significant sector of American govern-
mental operations.
